After all my research and conversations on the Pacific War over the years, I can’t help but see echoes today as I watch the news and read the papers and military magazines.
China pushes deeper into the Pacific—building bases and reshaping islands just as Japan did before and during WWII. Meanwhile, Russia provokes our Allies, our border, and our military. I wonder: is our military applying the lessons learned from WWII?
From assault tactics to force allocation, to caves and tunnels -history offers warnings we can’t afford to ignore.
Especially in the Pacific.
Take Peleliu, for example. Of course, I think a lot about that battle since my grandfather is blamed for thinking it would be a faster campaign but instead became a drawn-out horrific battle of attrition. Maybe the worst conditions and Japanese tactics my grandfather and the 1st Marine Division had faced in the Pacific since the landed in the Pacific in August 1942.
As he wrote after leaving the island, for all …”It was a “Hell hole.”
But…What if higher command had chosen not to split focus—invading Angaur and Ulithi at the same time as Peleliu—but instead concentrated Marines, Navy, and Army forces solely on Peleliu? Would the battle have been shorter? Would fewer lives have been lost?
In Bloody Beaches The Marines at Peleliu. Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret) notes there was a “paucity of resources” for Peleliu.
Angaur’s timing was also controversial from the start.
“The operation on Angaur, the planning which attended it and the decision on its timing, impacted heavily upon the Peleliu operation. The naval planners early on proposed landing on Angaur before Peleliu. Only when Major General Julian C. Smith, commanding Expeditionary Troops/X-Ray Planning Group, explained that such timing would invite the numerous Japanese in northern Palau to reinforce Peleliu was it agreed that Angaur be assaulted only after the Peleliu landing was assured of success. However, the Angaur landing was initiated before the Peleliu landing had been clearly resolved. The commanding general of the 81st Division wanted to land as soon as possible, and he was supported in his view by his naval task unit commander, Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy.
Opposing the 17 September date for the Angaur landing was Marine Major General Julian Smith. Smith argued that committing the element of III Corps Reserve before the Peleliu operation was more fully developed would be premature. His advice was ignored by Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson.
A related decision for 17 September committed the III Corps’ final reserve to the Ulithi landing. The task was assigned to the Western Attack Force, which was ordered to seize Ulithi with “available resources.”
Over General Smith’s advice, Wilkinson chose to commit the entire 323d RCT, the 81st Division’s other maneuver element. The 321st subsequently and successfully occupied an undefended Ulithi while reserves were sorely needed at Peleliu…”
On Peleliu, Marines faced tough resistance and terrible conditions along with the caves and tunnels the Japanese had built.
By September 21, General Geiger told General Rupertus the Marines could no longer hold Peleliu alone—help from the Army was essential.
Contrary to scuttlebutt, General Mueller never radioed to say, “We’re ready.” It was Geiger who initiated contact with Mueller, only to be told the 321st (of the 81st Division) could be available, but he needed time to reorganize them – while still engaged on Anguar.
Unsatisfied, General Geiger, General Julian Smith, and Admiral Forte went by ship to General Mueller’s headquarters on Angaur to press him directly to speed things up.
The 321st RCT reached Peleliu on September 23, but the remainder of the 81st could not be released. The assault phase on Angaur was not declared complete until October 14, and the full Army division was not available for Peleliu until October 22, when the final cave was cleared on Anguar.
By then, thousands of Marines had fallen or been injured in one of the Pacific’s bloodiest battles—casualties levels that might have been spared had higher command concentrated its strength?
But was Iwo Jima any different? Okinawa? Both would test the lessons in force allocation, timing, and the sheer cost of frontal assaults and the caves and suicide bombers.
At Iwo Jima, the Marine Corps effort was concentrated on one huge volcanic island—yet the Japanese, dug into caves and tunnels (Marines later said they could hear them beneath the volcanic sand), inflicted enormous casualties in a battle that dragged on far longer than predicted – like Peleliu.
What did we learn about the caves and tunnels we’d seen at Peleliu?
At Okinawa, the stakes grew even higher: Army and Marine divisions committed together, a drawn-out fight that became the bloodiest and deadliest (on both sides) of the Pacific campaign.
I am not a military planner, but it is stunning when you look at the numbers of lives lost and casualties in WWII. I pray our military leaders and experts are examining the lessons learned from WWII Pacific.
And show us a path towards peace through strength, not war.
